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Abstract 
Both experimental and empirical studies have shown that democratically imposing a policy that 
encourages cooperation (i.e., reflecting people’s votes) may increase its effectiveness by 
enhancing the voters’ cooperation behavior. But, do those involved in the democratic decision-
making process change their behavior when faced with an exogenously implemented rule? This 
paper experimentally shows that the voters that are involved in a successful democratic selection 
of a policy behave more pro-socially as consistent with recent studies. My experiment moreover 
shows that such a successful democratic imposition of the policy may increase the voters’ level 
of cooperation even when the policy is undemocratically imposed.  
JEL classification: C91, C92, D72, D78, H41 
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1. Introduction 
Democratic decision processes, in which rules are collectively selected by voting, are 
used in most societies and organizations today. Both empirical and experimental research 
suggests that the process by which a policy is implemented may change its outcome by affecting 
people’s level of cooperation on the relevant voted issue through various channels. There are 
three effects, among others, that democratic processes are known to have: the effects of a 
selection bias through the endogenous processes (i.e., selection effects), the effects of signals sent 
through the voting processes, and the democracy premium, which is an effect directly influencing 
people’s behavior (i.e, the residual that cannot be explained by the selection or signaling effects). 
The literature suggests that the third residual effect may be non-negligible (e.g., Bardhan 2000, 
Dal Bó et al. 2010, Frey 1997, Sutter et al. 2010, and Tyran and Feld 2006).
1
 Especially, Dal Bó 
et al. (2010) and Tyran and Feld (2006) find that the democracy premium may be substantial 
when a policy that can resolve or mitigate a problem is successfully implemented democratically.  
Another possible effect that democratic policy selections may have, related to the 
democracy premium, is changing people’s behavior outside the democratic environment. There is 
large literature on spill-over or transfer of institutional effects on people’s behavior from 
perspectives of other behavioral theories. First, according to the behavioral game theory, there is 
the so-called behavioral spill-over phenomenon. This refers to the situation where subjects’ 
decisions in an environment can be influenced by their own other decisions made in different 
environments (e.g., Bednar et al. 2012, Cason et al. 2012).  
Second, other studies have demonstrated that the negative effect of the use of monetary 
incentives in a task – motivation crowding-out – can be transferred to areas indirectly related to 
the incentivized task such as tasks without it (e.g., Frey 1993, Frey and Benz 2001, Osterloh and 
Frey 2000, Frey and Jegen 2001).
2
  
An indirect institutional effect in the context of democratic decision-making would be one 
that changes the voters’ behavior as a policy intends to even when the policy is undemocratically 
imposed, if they have experienced a successful democratic implementation of a policy in one area. 
This is a transfer of motivation crowding-in. For example, imagine a situation where students 
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 See Dal Bó (2010) for a summary of experimental evidence. 
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 Also see Gneezy and Rustichini (2001).  
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collectively imposed a No Smoking Policy, an ordinance whose violation is not punishable, into 
your school by voting. In this example, the students might be more likely to comply with the No 
Smoking Policy, compared with when the university exogenously imposed it without reflecting 
their votes or voices; but not only that, they might also become more likely to comply with the 
No Smoking Policy in public libraries where the rule was autocratically implemented if intrinsic 
motivations are crowded in among the students.  
Apart from these behavioral or institutional theories, income inequality-averse models, 
such as the prominent Fehr and Schmidt (1999), also predict such positive spill-over effects. 
Suppose that an inequality-averse person sees that her group collectively imposed a policy by 
voting. Suppose also that she expects that her group members are more likely to respond to the 
incentive change and behave more cooperatively because it was democratically chosen; and that 
accordingly mutual cooperation would be more easily attained. In this circumstance, she may 
raise her compliance, that is, increase her level of cooperation, also in her other group where a 
policy is autocratically imposed, as her income inequality with the others in the undemocratic 
environment would increase otherwise. Despite its possibility, such a spill-over effect on the 
voters’ behavior has not received attention in experimental research. 
We conduct a laboratory experiment in order to explore a possibility of a spill-over effect 
on the voters’ behavior triggered by democratic decision-making. The specific question asked in 
this paper is: Does succeeding in democratically imposing a non-deterrent sanction policy in a 
cooperation dilemma raise the voters’ level of cooperation even with an undemocratically 
imposed policy?  
Our experiment is based on the framework of a standard linear public goods game. The 
key design feature is that each subject belongs to two groups with distinct partners and 
simultaneously plays two public goods games. Each subject is given a fixed endowment for each 
group and makes an allocation decision between the private account and the public account in 
that group. Experimental parameters are set so that contributing zero points to the public account 
in each group is privately optimal, but full contribution is socially optimal. In this environment, a 
non-deterrent sanction policy may be imposed in each of their two groups. The non-deterrent 
sanction policy just mitigates the incentive to defect in social dilemmas without altering 
equilibria for selfish players (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). Thus, the mutual full free-riding 
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remains the unique equilibrium in the game even after the policy has been implemented. The 
setup that the two games are simultaneously played is selected as our focus is not on how 
people’s experiences in cooperation dilemmas under the democracy regime influence their future 
contribution behavior under undemocratic regimes, but on the presence of democracy premiums. 
In other words, excluding reputation effects is desirable. For some subjects, a non-deterrent 
sanction policy is selected democratically in one group, and it is undemocratically imposed by 
the computer in their other group. We treat these subjects as treatment subjects. For other 
subjects, the policy is undemocratically imposed by the computer in both of their two assigned 
groups. We treat these subjects as control subjects. In this paper, we call a group in which the 
implementation decision is democratically made the “democratic group,” irrespective of whether 
the policy is imposed or not. Likewise, we call a group in which the decision is undemocratically 
made the “undemocratic group.” 
Our experiment indicates that when the non-deterrent sanction policy is democratically 
imposed in a group, subjects who support the policy contribute to the democratic group 
significantly more than the subjects with the same preference that have never undergone the 
democratic change. In addition, the former treatment subjects contribute to their undemocratic 
groups in which the policy is also imposed significantly more, compared with the latter control 
subjects. This suggests that the democracy premium may be significantly larger than the 
literature have suggested by the amount of the spill-over effect. By contrast, we find that on 
average, neither the direct nor spill-over effect of democracy is substantial among the opponents 
of the non-deterrent penalty. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the experimental design. 
Section 3 reports results. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Experimental Design 
 The experiment has two periods. In each period, subjects play two public goods games, 
each of which has a group size of two (Section 2.1).
3
 At the onset of the experiment, each subject 
is randomly assigned to two groups of two individuals. To prevent repeated encounters, 
regardless of their decisions in Period 1, each subject is randomly assigned to two new groups 
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 We use the minimum group size to obtain the adequate number of independent observations.  
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each with a new different individual in Period 2. In other words, we employ the perfect stranger 
matching protocol. In the second period, a policy may be imposed either democratically or 
undemocratically in the public goods game (Section 2.2.3).  
When we measure the democracy premiums, we control for selection effects. Controlling 
for selection effects is important because subjects’ voting decisions and subsequent actions in a 
game may be correlated with unobservable factors. We apply the method proposed by Dal Bó et 
al. (2010) to our experiment in order to control for the selection effects. Specifically, all subjects 
make voting decisions and after that, the computer stochastically assigns either democratic or 
undemocratic implementation conditions to their groups (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). As discussed 
in Section 1, the effects of the democratic process in the voted agenda are composed of (a) 
selection effects, (b) signaling effects, and (c) the democracy premium. In this paper, we use the 
term “direct effect of democracy” to refer to effect (c). We use the term “spill-over effect of 
democracy” to refer to the effect of a person’s experience of the successful democratic 
imposition of a policy on her level of contribution with an undemocratically imposed policy. This 
is another possible democracy premium. We refer to these two democracy premiums together as 
the “effects of democracy.” The effects of democracy are measured based on subjects’ 
contribution amounts in Period 2. 
After Period 2, all subjects take the cognitive reflection test (CRT), and participate in a 
beauty contest game.
4
 Subsequently, they answer a questionnaire of demographics such as gender 
(female or male). The CRT scores, beauty contest game responses and the demographic data are 
used as control variables in analysis. Every participant privately receives payment immediately 
after the experiment. A schematic diagram of the experiment is included in Fig.1.
5
  
2.1. Period One 
 Period 1 plays a role in familiarizing subjects with the voluntary contribution dilemma 
before their voting decisions. In this period, each subject is given an endowment of 20 points (6 
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 The CRT consists of three questions. A subject earns seven points for each correct response to the three questions. 
See Frederick (2005) for the details. In the beauty contest game, each subject chooses an integer between 0 and 100. 
The subject with the closest number to two thirds of the average of all numbers in a session earns 120 points. See 
Nagel (1995). 
5
 Subjects are asked to answer a few comprehension questions to check their understanding of the experiment before 
the start of the experiment (see online Appendix A for the instructions). 
6 
 
points = $1 in the experiment) in each of their two assigned groups. Subjects then decide how to 
allocate their 20 points between a private account and a public account in each group. Only 
integers between 0 and 20 are allowed for this purpose. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) 
from the public account equals 0.6 in each group. Thus, subject i’s total payoff in Period 1 (𝜋𝑖
1) is 
the sum of her payoffs in each group as follows: 
𝜋𝑖
1 = ∑ [20 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 + .6 ∙ (𝐶𝑖,𝑘 + 𝐶𝑖′𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑘)]
2
𝑘=1 , (1) 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 is the contribution amount of subject i in the k
th
 group (k = 1 or 2) and 𝐶𝑖′𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑘 is 
the contribution amount of the subject i’s counterpart in the kth group. 
 Subjects are informed of their counterparts’ allocation amounts to the public account and 
of their own payoffs at the end of Period 1.  
2.2. Period Two  
 Our focus in this study is on subjects’ contribution behaviors in this period. Period 2 
consists of a voting stage followed by a contribution stage.   
2.2.1. The Voting Stage 
The voting stage proceeds as follows. At the beginning of Period 2, each subject votes on 
whether to employ a non-deterrent sanction policy in each of their two assigned groups 
separately (see subsection 2.2.3 for the details of the policy). Each individual votes twice as they 
belong to two distinct groups. We refer to our subjects as follows: “Yes-Yes voters” are those 
who supported the policy in both of their two assigned groups, “No-No voters” are those who 
voted against it in both of their two assigned groups, and “Yes-No voters” are those who voted in 
favor of the policy in one group and against it in the other.  
Once every subject votes, the computer stochastically assigns a democratic condition to 
one of their two assigned groups. The fraction of subjects to which the democratic condition is 
assigned is two-thirds.
6
 For these two-thirds of the subjects, irrespective of their votes, the 
computer stochastically imposes the non-deterrent policy in the other of their two groups. As for 
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 In the experiment, three groups (three subjects in total) are linked with each other, forming a triad. The democratic 
condition is randomly assigned to one group in each triad (the undemocratic condition is randomly assigned to two 
groups in each triad).  
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the remaining one-third of the subjects, the computer stochastically imposes the policy without 
reflecting their votes in both of their two assigned groups.  
The implementation procedure is as follows: if the democratic condition is given in a 
group, the computer counts subjects’ votes and the majority determines whether to impose the 
policy in that group. When one person votes for the policy but the other votes against it, the 
computer stochastically breaks the tie. If the undemocratic condition is assigned to a group, the 
computer does not consider their votes and just stochastically decides whether to impose the 
policy (subjects are informed that in this case their votes will not be considered and it is subject 
to the computer’s stochastic choice). We set the probability with which the policy is imposed as 
follows: under the undemocratic condition, or when the vote share is 50% under the democratic 
condition, the computer will implement the sanction policy with a probability of 90%.
7
 
We use the following notation: “Dem” (abbreviated from Democratic Decision-Making) 
indicates that a majority rule determined whether to impose the policy. “Comp” (abbreviated 
from Computer) means that the computer stochastically decided it without considering subjects’ 
votes. “Imp” means that the policy was imposed. In this paper, we focus on the following two 
implementation outcomes: “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” (treatment condition) and “Comp Imp, Comp 
Imp” (control condition).8 Here, “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” reads that for a subject, the non-
deterrent policy was imposed in one group reflecting her vote, whereas it was also imposed in her 
other group as a result of the computer’s stochastic choice. “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” reads that 
the policy was imposed in each of her two assigned groups as a result of the computer’s 
stochastic choice without reflecting her votes (Fig. 2). 
2.2.2. Information Feedback after the Voting Stage 
 Under the democratic condition, each subject obtains partial information about the vote of 
her counterpart as their votes determine the imposition of the sanction policy. For instance, 
suppose that a subject voted against the policy, but the policy was democratically imposed in that 
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 This probability was chosen as the aim of our study is to compare people’s compliance with the policy between the 
two implementation processes. This kind of adjustment in probability was also employed in other studies for their 
research purposes (e.g., Dal Bó et al. 2010). 
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 We note that there are seven pairs of possible implementation outcomes for each subject as they belong to two 
distinct groups. Referring to the situation where the policy was not imposed as “Not,” the other five possible 
implementation outcomes are “Dem Imp, Comp Not,” “Dem Not, Comp Imp,” “Dem Not, Comp Not,” “Comp Imp, 
Comp Not,” and “Comp Not, Comp Not.” Data on these five implementation outcomes is a by-product and is not 
used for this study. 
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group. In this case, she would become aware that her counterpart voted in favor of the policy. If 
we assume that a subject may develop beliefs about her partner’s future cooperation based on the 
partial information, the difference in the quantity of information between “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” 
and “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” may become a problem as her contribution behavior may be 
affected by such beliefs. For this reason, we make this partial information available also to 
subjects in the undemocratic condition following Dal Bó et al. (2010) to mitigate signaling 
effects.  
The procedure is as follows: all subjects, regardless of whether they are in democratic or 
undemocratic groups, are informed of whether “at most one person,” or “at least one person” 
voted for the policy in each of their two assigned groups (we refer to the former as the 
“information At-Most,” and the latter as the “information At-Least” in the paper). When the vote 
share in a group is 50%, the group members receive the Information At-Least and At-Most each 
with a probability of 50%. Theoretically, the quantity of the information At-Least received by 
subjects is only slightly higher in the “Dem Imp” condition than in the “Comp Imp” condition 
because of the adjustment in probability mentioned in Section 2.2.1.
9
  
We note that as an anonymous referee pointed out, having this information feedback 
alone is not enough to fully control for signaling effects in measuring the ‘direct’ effect of 
democracy even though the quantity of the information At-Least is balanced between the “Demo 
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 As explained, each subject is randomly assigned to groups in Period 2. Thus, theoretically, whether one is in a 
democratic group or an undemocratic group, the probability with which a Yes-Yes voter is paired with another Yes-
Yes voter or a Yes-No voter is the same. Therefore, for a Yes-Yes voter, regardless of the implementation processes, 
the probability with which the policy is implemented is almost the same: while it is 90% in an undemocratic group, it 
is 94.7% in a democratic group. Here, the latter probability was calculated by using the ex-post probabilities 
(Appendix Table B.1) based on the distribution of actual votes as follows:  
Pr(Partner is a Yes-Yes voter) + [.5+.5⋅.9]⋅Pr(Partner is a Yes-No voter) + .9⋅Pr(Partner is a No-No voter) = 94.7%. 
    As a result, the expected probabilities with which Yes-Yes voters will receive the information At-Least are 75.0% 
in their democratic groups under the treatment condition, and 73.7% in their undemocratic groups under the 
treatment condition or under the control condition. These two are almost the same to each other. Here, these two 
probabilities were calculated as follows:  
(a) Pr(info. At-Least in the democratic group|“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” and a decision-maker is a Yes-Yes voter) 
= 
Pr ("Dem Imp, Comp Imp" and the Yes-Yes voter receives the info. At-Least in her democratic group)
Pr ("Dem Imp, Comp Imp" and a decision-maker is a Yes-Yes voter)
 
= (.9∙{.423+(.5+.5∙.9∙.5)∙.10+.9∙.5∙.477})/{.9∙.947}≈75.0% 
(b) Pr(a Yes-Yes voter receives info. At-Least in her “Comp Imp” group under “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” |“Dem Imp, 
Comp Imp” and a decision-maker is a Yes-Yes voter) 
= Pr(a Yes-Yes voter receives info. At-Least in her “Comp Imp” group under “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” |“Comp Imp, 
Comp Imp” and a decision-maker is a Yes-Yes voter) 
= Pr(a Yes-Yes voter receives Info. At-Least in the “Comp Imp” group) = .423+.5⋅.10+.5⋅.5⋅.10+.5⋅.47.7 ≈ 73.7%. 
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Imp” and “Comp Imp” conditions. This is because subjects are not informed of the exact 
probability that the sanction policy is imposed in case of a tie in democratic groups. We discuss 
the details of the signaling effect and explore the relative strength of it compared with the direct 
effect of democracy in Section 4. By contrast, we are able to identify the ‘spill-over’ effect of 
democracy while fully controlling for the size of signaling effects if the quantity of the 
information At-Least is balanced. This is because we measure the difference in contribution 
amount between the treatment subjects (who belong to “Demo Imp, Comp Imp”) and the control 
subjects (who belong to “Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) in the same type of group – “Comp Imp” 
group. Before conducting data analyses, we test whether the quantity of the information At-Least 
is statistically balanced (a) between the treatment subjects in “Demo Imp” groups and the control 
subjects in “Comp Imp” groups; and (b) between the treatment subjects in “Comp Imp” groups 
and the control subjects in “Comp Imp” groups.10 
2.2.3. The Contribution Stage 
As discussed, a non-deterrent sanction policy may be imposed in each group in Period 2. 
The MPCR equals 0.6 in this period as well. When the policy is put in place, each point that a 
subject allocates to her private account results in a fine of 0.3 points. In other words, when 
subject i contributes 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 to her public account in her k
th
 group (k ∈ {1,2}), she obtains the 
following payoff (𝜋𝑖,𝑘
2 ): 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑘
2  = (20 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑘) ∙ (1 − 0.3 ∙ 𝐼{implement}) + 0.6 ∙ (𝐶𝑖,𝑘 + 𝐶𝑖′𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑘), (2) 
where 𝐼{implement} = 1 if the policy is implemented; = 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝑖′𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑘 is subject i’s 
interaction counterpart in her k
th
 group.  The total payoff of subject i in this period are the sum of 
her payoffs in her two assigned groups (𝜋𝑖
2 = ∑ 𝜋𝑖,𝑘
22
𝑘=1 ).  
We note that treatment subjects simultaneously belong to a democratic group and an 
undemocratic group. These two groups are different from each other even if the same policy is 
implemented in each group, because the implementation process is different in each group. In 
this contribution stage, subjects have reminders of what determined the scheme in each of their 
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 The quantity of the information At-Least was in fact statistically balanced between the two kinds of groups in the 
experiment (see Section 3). This was expected as explained in footnote 9. 
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two assigned groups and how the vote went in each group on their computer screens to avoid 
confusion (see Appendix Fig.B.1 for examples of reminders on the screen). 
2.2.4. Some Discussions concerning Predictions 
Regardless of whether the sanction policy is imposed in Period 2, contributing nothing to 
the public account is the strictly dominant strategy for a subject under the assumption that the 
subject is selfish. This is because the policy is sufficiently weak: 1.0 − 0.3 > 0.6 (see Eq. (2)). 
As a result, allocating all points to her private account is the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) for 
material payoff maximizers, although contributing the full endowment to the public account is 
the social optimum. Therefore, the sanction policy, if imposed, will cause her to pay a maximum 
fine of 6 points (= 0.3 × 20). Each subject’s vote is pivotal in each group as the group size is two. 
Thus, the standard theory predicts that each subject will vote against the policy in both of her two 
assigned groups (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium). Appendix Fig. B.2 includes the game tree 
of the experiment. 
Subjects may, however, vote for the policy and then voluntarily contribute to that group 
when the policy is selected. This is because, first of all, the sanction policy reduces the 
temptation to defect. If some subjects are not self-interested and instead have other-regarding 
preferences, such as reciprocity (e.g., Rabin 1993) and income inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999), mutual cooperation would become more easily achieved as an equilibrium with 
help of the non-deterrent sanction policy. Second, voting in favor of the sanction policy could be 
considered a credible way of signaling an intention to cooperate, since each subject knows that 
their votes will be informed to their partners by the information feedback rule.  
Subjects’ compliance or contribution decisions with the sanction policy might differ by 
how a policy is imposed as in other related studies. If experiencing a successful democratic 
imposition of the policy affects subjects’ beliefs about their partners’ future action choices or 
enhance their social preferences, subjects in the democratic group may contribute more to that 
group, compared with the control subjects. Further, subjects’ responses to the successful 
endogenous imposition may differ by voter type. For instance, suppose that subjects have 
reciprocal preferences. Then, Yes-Yes voters may exhibit positive reciprocity for the outcome 
that the policy was imposed reflecting their votes. Such reciprocity is absent in the undemocratic 
11 
 
condition as the computer stochastically imposes a policy in that condition. If reciprocity plays a 
role, we may find positive direct effects of democracy for Yes-Yes voters.  
As discussed in Section 1, moreover, the spill-over or transfer of institutional effects, or 
income inequality-averse preference models can predict the presence of positive spill-over effects 
of democracy if the direct effect of democracy is present.  
3. Results 
A total of three hundred undergraduate students at Brown University participated in the 
experiment in April and May, 2010. 15 sessions were conducted in a computer laboratory at 
Brown University.
11
 No subject participated in more than one session. The sessions lasted around 
one hour on average. Subjects were privately paid at the end of the experiment. The average 
earnings were $21.38 (including a $5 participation fee) with a standard deviation of $5.04. The 
instructions for the experiment were neutrally framed. The instructions were read aloud by the 
experimenter to subjects. The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
Communication between subjects was not permitted during sessions. 
 The average contribution in Period 1 was 5.96 points, with a standard deviation of 6.06 
points. Contributing 30% of the endowment in a one-shot experiment is not unusual. This is near 
the lower end of the range that is predicted from previous experiments in the literature, given the 
lower efficiency of the group optimum (see Ledyard (1995) and Zelmer (2003)).  
Out of the 300 subjects, around 42% of them voted for the non-deterrent policy in both of 
their two assigned groups, 48% voted against the policy in both of their assigned groups, and 
only 10% of them voted differently in their two groups (Appendix Table B.1). Considering this 
distribution, we focus on measuring the effects of democracy on the Yes-Yes and No-No voters 
only. As a result of the subjects’ votes and the computer’s stochastic decisions, 120 subjects were 
faced with the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) and 76 were faced with the control 
condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) in Period 2. Of the 120 treatment subjects, 67 were Yes-Yes 
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 Participants were recruited from the general student population there, using the Brown University Social Science 
Experiment Lab (BUSSEL) on-line recruitment system. 46 out of the 300 subjects listed economics as one of their 
concentrations. This fraction was similar to the proportion of economics majors in the university’s undergraduate 
population. Other participants came from fields ranging from the humanities to the sciences. The number of 
participants per session was 21, 18 or 15. All subjects were first-time participants in public goods game experiments. 
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voters and 37 were No-No voters. Of the 76 control subjects, 31 were Yes-Yes voters and 37 
were No-No voters (Appendix Table B.2).  
3.1. The Direct and Spill-Over Effects of Democracy 
In the experiment, all subjects received either the information At-Least or the information 
At-Most, regardless of whether they belonged to a democratic group or an undemocratic group. 
The fractions of subjects that received the information At-Least were statistically balanced 
between the democratic and undemocratic conditions for each voter type.
12
 Thus, we can measure 
the direct effect of democracy while controlling for signaling effects to a large degree. The spill-
over effect of democracy can be measured with signaling effects fully controlling for. We 
identify the two kinds of democracy premiums for each voter type.
13
  The direct effect of 
democracy is identified by comparing (a) the contribution amounts in the democratic groups in 
the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) and (b) the contribution amounts in the 
undemocratic groups in the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”). The spill-over effect of 
democracy is identified by comparing (c) the contribution amounts in the undemocratic groups in 
the treatment condition and (b) mentioned above (See Figure 2 also).
14
  
3.1.1. The Effects of Democracy on Yes-Yes Voters   
The contribution amounts by the supporters of the non-deterrent sanction substantially 
differ by their experience of the democratic process. Yes-Yes voters on average contributed 
16.55 points to their democratic groups and 15.73 points to their undemocratic groups in the 
treatment condition (Table 1). This is in sharp contrast with Yes-Yes voters in the control 
condition: they contributed much smaller amounts, 12.05 points on average, to their 
                                                          
12
 In the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), out of the 67 Yes-Yes voters, 77.6% of them received the 
information At-Least in their democratic groups and 71.6% received it in their undemocratic groups. By contrast, in 
the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”), out of the 37 Yes-Yes voters, they received it in 66.1% of the cases. 
The ratios, 77.6%, 71.6% and 66.1% are not statistically significant according to two-sided, two-sample tests of 
proportions. Similar holds also for No-No voters. In the treatment condition, out of the 37 No-No voters, 37.8% of 
them received the information At-Least in their democratic groups and 21.6% received it in their undemocratic 
groups. By contrast, in the control condition, No-No voters received it in 28.4% of the cases. The ratios, 37.8%, 
21.6%, and 28.4% are not statistically different. See Appendix Table B.4 and footnote 9 also. 
13
 In the working paper version of this paper, we also explored how the effects of democracy differ by gender or by 
cooperative disposition, finding that the effects of democracy we find for those who support the policy are driven by 
the male subjects. See Kamei (2014) for the details. 
14
 We use regression methods to identify the two democracy premiums as it enables us to include control variables 
for robustness check. We acknowledge that non-parametric tests are equally important; we report Mann-Whitney test 
results in footnotes 15 and 20. As explained later, our findings are robust. 
13 
 
undemocratic groups. Thus, the direct effect of democracy is 4.5 points (=16.55−12.05), which is 
22.5% of the endowment. The spill-over effect of democracy is 3.7 points (=15.73−12.05), which 
is 18.4% of the endowment. A regression analysis, shown in column (1) and (5) of Table 2, finds 
that both the direct and spill-over effects of democracy are significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively.
15
 The sizes of the direct effect and of the spill-over effect decrease to 3.35 points 
and 3.05 points, which are reductions of 25.5% and 17.7% respectively, if control variables are 
added, as shown in columns (2) and (6), but these are significant at the 10% level. The size of the 
direct effect of democracy is greater than that of the spill-over effect of democracy.
16
  
The effects of democracy can alternatively be measured by the use of the median. As 
shown in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), both the direct and spill-over effects are significant at the 
1% or 5% level, regardless of whether control variables are included or not. 
 Our result that Yes-Yes voters raise their level of cooperation significantly more 
responding to a democratically imposed non-deterrent policy, compared with Yes-Yes voters 
under the control, is consistent with recent work by Dal Bó et al. (2010) and Tyran and Feld 
(2006).
17
 The results of ours and these previous studies resonate with the idea that the supporters 
of a policy exhibit a strong motivation crowding-in effect or strong positive reciprocity to the 
collective outcome that a policy is democratically imposed reflecting their approving votes. The 
result that the supporters of the sanction in the treatment condition raise their compliance even 
with an undemocratically imposed sanction rule implies that the impact may spill over to their 
behavior in a second domain.
18
 
                                                          
15
 The average contribution of 16.55 points in the treatment condition and 12.05 points in the control condition are 
significantly different according to an individual-level Mann-Whitney test (p-value = .0051, two-tailed), so are 15.73 
points and 12.05 points (p-value = .018, two-tailed). The regression models in Table 2 (and Table 3) were estimated 
separately for each of the direct and spill-over effects of democracy. This is because including contribution amounts 
both in their democratic and undemocratic groups along with two dummy variables in a single equation to measure 
the direct and spill-over effects requires clustering standard errors by individual ID. However, the finite sample bias 
of clustering is known to be greater when the size of clusters is small. 
16
 They are significantly different at the 10% level if we use one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test (p-value = 0.080). 
This is suggestive evidence of the treatment subjects discriminating their contribution behaviors between the two 
groups to some degree. 
17
 Dal Bó et al. (2010) shows that when a prisoner’s dilemma game is democratically changed to a coordination 
game where the mutual cooperation is also an equilibrium, the supporters of the modification cooperate significantly 
more. Tyran and Feld (2006) show the possibility of a significant democratic effect in the case of a lump-sum non-
deterrent fine in a social dilemma. 
18
 A reader may pose the possibility that some subjects were confused about what determined the scheme in each of 
their two assigned groups in the contribution stage. However, this is very unlikely since the voting stage proceeded 
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Result 1: Yes-Yes voters exhibit the direct and spill-over effects of democracy.  
 The fractions of subjects that received the information At-Least were statistically 
balanced between democratic groups and undemocratic groups for each voter type. However, as 
an anonymous referee pointed out, I acknowledge that the equal distributions of information do 
not assure that subjects have the same posterior beliefs between the “Demo Imp” condition and 
“Comp Imp” condition. More specifically, Yes-Yes voters’ posterior beliefs on their partner’s 
voter type when they received the information At-Least depend on whether they were in the 
“Demo Imp condition” or “Comp Imp” condition. Thus, the result on the direct effect of 
democracy in Result 1 may not be clean. This happens due to the fact that the non-deterrent 
sanction policy was imposed with a probability of 90% in case of a tie under the “Dem Imp” 
condition, but subjects were not informed of the exact probability. In the remaining of Section 
3.1.1, we explain why this design piece can lead to a difference in subjects’ posterior belief. We 
then show that our results on the direct effect in Result 1 are not attributable to signaling effects. 
We note that Yes-Yes voters who received the information At-Most are fully comparable 
between the “Dem Imp” and “Comp Imp” conditions because Yes-Yes voters’ posterior beliefs 
that opponents are also Yes-Yes voters are 0 with the information At-Most in both of the 
conditions.  
On the one hand, the posterior belief that a Yes-Yes subject forms in the “Dem Imp” 
group depends on her prior belief that her partner is a Yes-Yes voter (which we denote as 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟), 
which information she receives (At-Most or At-Least), and the probability that the computer 
imposes the non-deterrent sanction in case of a tie. We use γ  [0, 1] to express the probability 
that the computer imposes it in case of a tie. Then, according to the Bayes Rule, the Yes-Yes 
voter believes that her opponent is also a Yes-Yes voter with a probability of 𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝐼𝑚𝑝
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 =
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟+0.5∙𝛾𝑏∙(1−𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟)
 if she receives the information At-Least. Here, 𝛾𝑏 is her belief on γ. On the 
other hand, the posterior belief that a Yes-Yes voter forms in the “Comp Imp” group depends on 
his prior belief and which information he receives (At-Most or At-Least) only. The Yes-Yes 
voter’s posterior belief that his opponent is also a Yes-Yes voter is: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
separately in each of their two assigned groups. In addition, in the contribution stage subjects received reminders 
about implementation outcomes, including what determined the scheme in each of their two assigned groups (the 
computer or their votes), on their computer screens (see Sections 2.2.3 and Appendix Fig. B.1). 
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𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 𝐼𝑚𝑝
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 =
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟+0.5∙(1−𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟)
 if he receives the information At-Least. We see that unless 𝛾𝑏 = 
1, 𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝐼𝑚𝑝
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 > 𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 𝐼𝑚𝑝
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
. In the experiment, γ = .9, which is close to 1.0; however, the value of 
γ is not known to subjects. Therefore, subjects’ beliefs on γ are not equal to .9. We can assume 
that subjects believe, for example, that the sanction policy would be imposed with a probability 
of 50% (i.e., γ = .5 < .9), which makes 𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝐼𝑚𝑝
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
 larger. In other words, signaling effects can be 
theoretically stronger under the “Demo Imp” groups than under the “Comp Imp” groups, and 
thus contribution amounts made in the “Demo Imp” groups may be overestimated. 
In order to formally study how Yes-Yes voters’ contribution behaviors are affected by 
posterior beliefs, we conduct a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is subject i’s 
contribution amount in her democratic group in the treatment condition (“Demo Imp, Comp 
Imp”). The independent variables include the Information At-Least dummy variable (which 
equals 1 if i receives the information At-Least; 0 otherwise). With this regression analysis, we 
can gauge the effect of having the information At-Least, instead of the information At-Most, on 
the treatment subjects’ action choices in the “Demo Imp” groups. As shown in Appendix Table 
B.6, we find that the Information At-Least dummy fails to obtain a significant coefficient. This 
means that signaling effects are not the main forces that drive Result 1 concerning the direct 
effect of democracy. We note that it is well-known that signaling effects are usually important 
channels that boost cooperation (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). A likely reason that the information 
At-Least dummy does not obtain a significant coefficient is that Yes-Yes voters contributed very 
large amounts even when they received the Information ‘At-Most’ (with which 𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝐼𝑚𝑝
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 = 0) 
in our context (See Table B.4). This suggests that the direct effect of democracy was indeed 
strong and there was no room for a further increase in contribution by having additional positive 
signaling effects in the experiment. 
We lastly note that the ‘spill-over’ effect of democracy in Result 1 was identified while 
signaling effects were fully controlled for since the quantity of the information At-Last in the 
“Comp Imp” groups was sufficiently balanced between Yes-Yes voters in the treatment and 
control conditions. The posterior beliefs of the treatment and control subjects are both given by 
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𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 𝐼𝑚𝑝
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟+0.5∙(1−𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟)
 mentioned above.
19
 It should also be noted that for each Yes-Yes 
voter in the treatment condition, a partner in the “Comp Imp” group was different from her other 
partner in the “Demo Imp” group.   
3.1.2. The Effects of Democracy on No-No voters   
The impacts of democracy on No-No voters are different from those on Yes-Yes voters. 
On the one hand, the opponents of the non-deterrent sanction policy in the treatment condition on 
average contributed 7.35 points in their democratic groups and 7.65 points in their undemocratic 
groups.  On the other hand, No-No voters in the control condition on average contributed 5.84 
points in their undemocratic groups (Table 1). The direct effect of democracy, 1.51 points on 
average (=7.35−5.84), and the spill-over effect of democracy, 1.81 points on average 
(=7.65−5.84), are both insignificant (Table 3).20 Results are similar when the median contribution 
is used to gauge the direct or spill-over effect on No-No voters. 
 The result that the opponents of the policy exhibit neither the direct nor spill-over effect 
of democracy is similar to the result in Dal Bó et al. (2010). 
Result 2: No-No voters do not exhibit either the direct or spill-over effect of democracy.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper provides the first evidence that a successful democratic imposition of a policy 
may generate not only a direct effect, but also a spill-over effect on behaviors of those who are 
involved in the democratic policy selection. When the subjects who democratically changed the 
payoff structure in one group are placed in other groups in which the change was imposed 
undemocratically, they contributed significantly more than those who have never undergone the 
                                                          
19
 We ran regressions where the dependent variable is Yes-Yes voters’ contribution amounts under the “Comp Imp” 
group in the treatment condition (“Demo Imp, Comp Imp”) condition nevertheless. As in the regression result for the 
direct effect part, we find that Yes-Yes voters’ action choices were little affected by which information (the 
information At-Least or At-Most) they received. This results from the finding that the democracy spill-over is indeed 
strong and the treatment subjects contributed very large amounts in the “Comp Imp” groups without any help of 
signaling effects (i.e., with receiving the information At-Most). See columns (3) and (4) of Appendix Table B.6. 
20
 The average contribution of 7.35 points in the treatment condition and 5.84 points in the control condition are not 
significantly different according to an individual-level Mann-Whitney test (p-value = .45, two-tailed), nor are that of 
7.65 points and 5.84 points (p-value = .41, two-tailed). 
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democratic change. Moreover, our data finds that these positive democracy premiums were 
limited for those assenting to the policy; the effects were not seen in those who voted against it.  
Our findings have broad implications for economic policy, organization economics, and 
political economy. When a policy is democratically implemented reflecting people’s votes, the 
extra effects of a democratically implemented policy (i.e., democracy premiums) may not be 
limited to the relevant social dilemma, but may also emerge in another social dilemma through 
resilient behavioral responses of those assenting to the policy. Such a spill-over effect may be 
substantial even if the policy is sufficiently weak as in the non-deterrent policy in this study.  
 As a final remark, we note that the result on the spill-over effect has a methodological 
implication in identifying the effects of a policy or democracy premiums. We have two potential 
methods to measure such effects, whether experiments or empirical studies. The first method is to 
let each subject play games both in the treatment condition and the control condition, and then to 
compare their behaviors between the two conditions. The second method is, by contrast, to divide 
subjects into two kinds of groups: treatment groups and control groups, let them play the games 
only in one assigned condition and compare behaviors between the two kinds of groups. Which 
method should we use? Our results indicate that the first method may not be accurate, due to the 
spill-over effect of democracy, and that employing the second method may be a more 
conservative way to measure the effects. 
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Fig. 1. Schematic Diagram of the Experiment 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 2. Treatment Subjects and Control Subjects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each subject belongs to two distinct groups. Gray circles (●) indicate two distinct counterparts of treatment 
and control subjects. 
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Table 1. The Average Contribution Amounts Faced with Imposed Sanction Policies 
 
   
 
 Period 1 average contribution (x)
#1 
All data 
Lower 25%: 
x = 0.0 
    Middle 50%: 
0.0 < x < 10.0 
     Lower half: 
0.0 < x ≤ 5.0 
Upper half: 
5.0 < x < 10.0 
Upper 25%: 
x ≥ 10.0 
       
       
 I. Treatment Condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”)   
       
a. Yes-Yes voters       
a1. Contributions to their democratic groups (“Demo Imp”)     
                 16.6 (6.65) 11.7 (9.85) 18.0 (3.59) 19.0 (2.24) 17.6 (3.97) 18.6 (3.90) 
       
a2. Contributions to their undemocratic groups (“Comp Imp”)     
 15.7 (7.28) 9.72 (10.1) 17.9 (3.36) 18.6 (3.13) 17.6 (3.52) 18.0 (4.85) 
b. No-No voters       
b1. Contributions to their democratic groups (“Demo Imp”) 
 
   
 7.35 (8.31) 6.94 (9.26) 8.43 (7.52) 6.63 (7.11) 10.8 (8.01) 5.80 (8.14) 
b2. Contributions to their undemocratic groups (“Comp Imp”)     
 7.65 (8.40) 6.94 (9.26) 9.07 (7.57) 8.00 (7.33) 10.5 (8.34) 6.20 (8.50) 
       
II. Control Condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”)     
       
c. Yes-Yes voters       
       
c1. Contributions to their undemocratic groups (“Comp Imp”)     
 12.0 (8.43) 6.00 (8.43) 13.7 (6.57) 15.1 (6.32) 11.6 (6.95) 18.1 (3.61) 
d. No-No voters       
d1. Contributions to their undemocratic groups (“Comp Imp”) 
 
   
 5.84 (7.81) 2.71 (6.75) 9.45 (5.45) 9.33 (6.09) 9.63 (5.22) 18.8 (20.2) 
       
 
Notes: The numbers are average contribution amounts. The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. See Appendix Table B.3 for the average contribution 
amounts under other implementation outcomes. See Tables 2 and 3 for econometric tests of the differences in the contribution amount between the treatment and 
control subjects. 
#1 
These columns indicate average contributions by period 1 average contribution amounts.  
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Table 2. The Effects of Democracy on Yes-Yes voters  
 
(I) The Direct Effect of Democracy  (II) The Spill-Over Effect of Democracy 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the democratic groups by Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the undemocratic groups by  
Yes-Yes voters in the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and  Yes-Yes voters in the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and contribution  
contribution amounts by Yes-Yes voters in the control condition (“Comp amounts by Yes-Yes voters in the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”)  
Imp, Comp Imp”) (Reference Group) (Reference Group) 
 
           
 Average Effects Median Effects   Average Effects Median Effects 
Independent Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4)   Independent Variable (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
           
“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” dummy 
[the direct effect] 
4.50*** 
(1.58) 
3.35* 
(1.77) 
5.00*** 
(1.55) 
4.78*** 
(0.15) 
 “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” dummy 
[the spill-over effect] 
3.68** 
(1.66) 
3.05* 
(1.76) 
5.00*** 
(1.56) 
3.07** 
(1.49) 
           
Control variables No Yes No Yes  Control variables No Yes No Yes 
   
 
 
      
Period 1 average contribution ---- 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
---- 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
 
Period 1 average contribution ---- 
0.45*** 
(0.13) 
---- 
0.31*** 
(0.11) 
           
Period 1 partners’ average 
contribution 
---- 
-0.068 
(0.16) 
---- 
-0.0060 
(0.014) 
 Period 1 partners’ average 
contribution 
---- 
-0.23 
(0.16) 
---- 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
           
Female {=1 if female; = 0 
otherwise} 
---- 
0.94 
(1.77) 
---- 
-0.0015 
(0.14) 
 Female {=1 if female; = 0 
otherwise} 
---- 
0.74 
(1.76) 
---- 
-0.040 
(1.45) 
   
 
 
      
The number of economics 
courses taken 
---- 
-0.23 
(0.30) 
---- 
-0.16*** 
(0.025) 
 The number of economics  
courses taken 
---- 
-0.72** 
(0.29) 
---- 
-0.97*** 
(0.21) 
           
The number of political science 
courses taken 
---- 
0.47 
(0.42) 
---- 
0.15*** 
(0.036) 
 The number of political science 
courses taken 
---- 
0.60 
(0.42) 
---- 
0.14 
(0.29) 
           
The first principal component 
of IQ measures
#1
 
---- 
-0.72 
(0.56) 
---- 
-0.045 
(0.046) 
 The first principal component of 
IQ measures
#1
 
---- 
-0.76 
(0.56) 
---- 
-0.69 
(0.45) 
           
Constant 12.0*** 9.51*** 15.00*** 15.0***  Constant 12.0*** 10.6*** 15.0*** 13.1*** 
 (1.30) (1.78) (1.43) (0.15)   (1.38) (1.77) (1.43) (1.47) 
           
# of Observations 98 90
#2
 98 90
#2
  # of Observations 98 90
#2
 98 90
#2
 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R-Squared  .0689 .1966 .0545 .0461  Adjusted (Pseudo) R-Squared  .0387 .2624 .0488 .1071 
           
 
Notes: OLS regressions in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) and median (quantile) regressions in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). The reference group in each regression is the 
average contribution amount of Yes-Yes voters in the control condition; in this condition, since each subject makes two contribution decisions in the same environment, 
the average of the two contribution amounts is used as each individual’s data. 
#1
 Four IQ measures were elicited from subjects in the experiment (beauty contest game 
scores, cognitive reflection test scores, SAT (math) scores and SAT (verbal) scores). The first principal components were created using the 67 subjects in the treatment 
condition and the 31 subjects in the control condition in order to deal with a multicolinearity problem. Appendix Table B.5 reports supplementary regression analyses 
when only one of the four IQ measures, instead of the first principal components, is used as an IQ measure, finding that the direct and spill-over effects are significant at 
the 5% or 10% level. 
#2 
Eight subjects were excluded as they did not answer their SAT scores. 
   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at 
the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table 3. The Effects of Democracy on No-No voters  
 
(I) The Direct Effect of Democracy  (II) The Spill-Over Effect of Democracy 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the democratic groups by No-No  Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the undemocratic groups by  
voters in the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and contribution  No-No voters in the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and contribution  
amounts by No-No voters in the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) ( amounts by No-No voters in the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) ( 
Reference group). Reference group). 
 
           
 Average Effects Median Effects   Average Effects Median Effects 
Independent Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4)   Independent Variable (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
           
“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” dummy 
[the direct effect] 
1.51 
(1.88) 
0.60 
(1.79) 
5.00 
(4.74) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” dummy 
[the spill-over effect] 
1.81 
(1.89) 
0.89 
(1.81) 
3.00 
(4.79) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
           
Control variables No Yes No Yes  Control variables No Yes No Yes 
   
 
 
      
Period 1 average contribution ---- 
.49** 
(1.79) 
---- 
.77*** 
(.00) 
 
Period 1 average contribution ---- 
.52** 
(.20) 
---- 
.77*** 
(.000) 
           
Period 1 partners’ average 
contribution 
---- 
.29 
(.21) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 Period 1 partners’ average 
contribution 
---- 
.34 
(.22) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
           
Female {=1 if female; = 0 
otherwise} 
---- 
3.67* 
(1.92) 
---- 
5.00*** 
(.00) 
 Female {=1 if female; = 0 
otherwise} 
---- 
3.50* 
(1.93) 
---- 
5.00*** 
(.00) 
  
         
The number of economics 
courses taken 
---- 
-.29 
(.35) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 The number of economics  
courses taken 
---- 
-.94 
(.35) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
           
The number of political science 
courses taken 
---- 
.39 
(.56) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 The number of political 
science courses taken 
---- 
.26 
(.56) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
           
The first principal component of 
IQ measures
#1
 
---- 
.34 
(.67) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 The first principal component 
of IQ measures
#1
 
---- 
.28 
(.68) 
---- 
0.00 
(0.00) 
           
Constant 5.84*** 1.98  0.00  Constant 5.84*** 1.45 0.00 0.00 
 (1.33) (1.87)  (0.00)   (1.33) (1.89) (2.71) (0.00) 
           
# of Observations 74 71
#2
 74 71  # of Observations 74 71 74 71 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R-Squared  .0081 .1364 .0102 .2561  Adjusted (Pseudo) R-Squared  .0126 .1365 .0060 .2537 
           
 
Notes: OLS regressions in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) and median (quantile) regressions in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). The reference group in each regression is the 
average contribution amount of No-No voters in the control condition; in this condition, since each subject makes two contribution decisions in the same environment, the 
average of the two contribution amounts is used as each individual’s data. 
#1
 Four IQ measures were elicited from subjects in the experiment (beauty contest game scores, 
cognitive reflection test scores, SAT (math) scores and SAT (verbal) scores). The first principal components were created using the 37 subjects in the treatment condition 
and the 37 subjects in the control condition in order to deal with a multicolinearity problem. Appendix Table B.7 reports supplementary regression analyses when only 
one of the four IQ measures, instead of the first principal components, is used as an IQ measure, finding that neither the direct nor spill-over effect is significant. 
#2 
Three 
subjects were excluded as they did not answer their SAT scores. 
   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Appendix A: Instructions 
 
A.1. Main Part of Experiments 
 
At the beginning of the session, the experimenter stated that all decisions made in the experiment 
would be anonymous, since records of those decisions would not contain names or identifiers 
that could be linked to specific participants. Also the experimenter stated that there should be no 
talking or any other kind of communication among the subjects until the experiment ended. 
  
Subsequently, the experimenter stated that the participants could raise their hands to ask 
clarifying questions at any time, but questions had to be limited to clarifications of the procedure 
and payment formulas. 
 
The experimenter then said to all present subjects:  
 
“Today you will take part in one main experiment and one shorter task, and we expect the whole 
session to take approximately one hour but definitely less than one and a half hours. The main 
experiment is divided into two phases of one period each. So, in total, there are two periods. I 
will now read the instructions for the first period. Once phase 1 is over you will receive further 
instructions.”   
 
The experimenter then began to read the following instructions aloud. The subjects also had 
printed copies of these instructions. 
 
Welcome 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the $5 guaranteed 
for your participation. 
 
Not for Publication 
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During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. 
 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment 
points will be converted to U.S. dollars at the following rate: 
 
6 points = $1 
 
(This means each point will exchange for just under 17 cents of real money). At the end of the 
experiment your total earnings (including the $5 participation fee) will be paid out to you in 
cash. 
 
The experiment has 2 phases each consisting of 1 period (in total, 2 periods). The following 
instructions explain the details of Phase 1. The details of the next phase will be explained later. 
 
 
Instructions for Phase 1  
 
In the experiment, each participant is randomly assigned to two groups of 2 individuals.  This 
means that you and another participant belong to each group. The other individuals in the two 
groups are also different from one another.  You will be part of the same groups in this period 
only. After this period, you will be assigned to two new groups consisting of you and two 
participants with whom you were not paired in this phase. Nobody will know which other 
participants are in their groups during the experiment, and nobody will be informed as to who 
was in which group after the experiment. 
 
Each individual in your group, yourself included, will be given an endowment of 20 points. 
Since each participant belongs to two groups, the participant will be given two endowments of 
20 points (in total, 40 points). 
Your decision: 
You and the other individual in your group will simultaneously decide how to use the 
endowment. There are two possibilities: 
 
1. You can allocate points to a group account. 
2. You can allocate points to a private account. 
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Notice that you belong to two groups and, thus, you simultaneously make two allocation 
decisions regarding two endowments. You will be asked to indicate the number of points you 
want to allocate to the group account. Only integers between 0 and 20 are allowed for this 
purpose. The remaining points will be automatically allocated to your private account. Your 
earnings depend on the total number of points in the group account, and the number of points in 
your private account. 
 
How to calculate your earnings: 
Your earnings from your private account are equal to the number of points you allocate to that 
account. That is, for each point you allocate to your private account you get 1 point as 
earnings. For example, your earnings from the private account equal 3 points if you allocate 3 
points to that account. The points you allocate to your private account do not affect the earnings 
of the other in your group.  
 
Your earnings from the group account equal the sum of points allocated to the group account by 
you and the other participant multiplied by 0.6. For each point you allocate to the group 
account you and the other in your group each get 0.6 points as earnings. For example, if the 
sum of points in the group account is 15, then your earnings from the group account and the 
earnings of the other participant in your group from this group account are equal to 9 points.  
 
Considering that you belong to two groups, your earnings consist of the sum of your group 1 
earnings and group 2 earnings. Earnings in each group can be calculated with the following 
formula: 
 
20 – (points you allocated to the group account) + 0.6 * (sum of points allocated by you and 
the other individual in your group to the group account)    
 
Note that you get 1 point as earnings for each point you allocate to your private account. If you 
instead allocate 1 extra point to the group account, your earnings from the group account 
increase by 0.6 * 1 = 0.6 points. Also your earnings from your private account will decrease by 1 
point.  However, by allocating 1 extra point to the group account, the earnings of the other 
individual in your group also increase by 0.6 points. Therefore, the total group earnings increase 
by 0.6 * 2 = 1.2 points. Note that you also obtain earnings from points allocated to the group 
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account by the other individual. You obtain 0.6 * 1 = 0.6 points for each point allocated to the 
group account by the other individual. 
 
Example: 
Suppose you allocate 5 points and 12 points to group account 1 and group account 2, 
respectively. The other individual in your group 1 allocates 10 points to group account 1, and the 
other individual in your group 2 allocates 7 points to group account 2.  
In this case, the sum of points in group account 1 is  5(your allocation) + 10(the other individual’s allocation) = 15 points, 
and thus, each individual in group 1 gets earnings of 0.6 * 15 = 9 points from the group account.  
Likewise, the sum of points in group account 2 is  12(your allocation) + 7(the other individual’s allocation) = 19 points. 
Thus, each individual in group 2 gets earnings of 0.6 * 19 = 11.4 points from the group account. 
 
Thus, your earnings from your interaction in group 1 are: 20 – 5 + (0.6 * 15) = 15 + 9 = 24 
points, and your earnings from your interaction in group 2 are: 20 – 12 + (0.6 * 19) = 8 + 11.4 = 
19.4 points. 
Your total earnings in this period are: 24 points + 19.4 points = 43.4 points. 
 
Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions.  Raise your hand if you need help.  A member of the 
experiment team will come to help you and will check your answers when you are done.  
 
1. How many periods do you have in Phase 1? 
___________________ 
 
 
2. Suppose the other individual in your group 1 allocates 10 points to group account 1, and the 
other individual in your group 2 allocates 5 points to group account 2. 
 
a) How much do you earn from your interaction in group 1 if you allocate 0 points to group 
account 1?  
____________ points 
 
b) How much do you earn from your interaction in group 1 if you allocate 10 points to group 
account 1?  
5 
 
____________ points 
 
c) How much do you earn from your interaction in group 1 if you allocate 20 points to group 
account 1?  
____________ points 
  
d) How much do you earn in total if you allocate 5 points to group account 1, and  
15 points to group account 2? 
____________ points 
 
 
 
Immediately before the subjects began to answer the comprehension questions, the experimenter 
instructed subjects to try to answer the questions on their own. The experimenter added that if 
subjects had any questions, they should raise their hand and the experimenter would come to 
help them.  
 
 
When every subject had solved all of the questions, the experimenter explained the correct 
answers using the white board. 
 
 
When Phase 1 was over, the experimenter read the following instructions: 
 
 
“We’ve just completed phase 1 and will now begin Phase 2, which also consists of one period of 
play.  Phase 2 is different from Phase 1. Now, I will distribute the new instructions.” 
 
 
The experimenter then read aloud the following instructions. Subjects also had printed copies of 
these instructions. 
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Instructions for Phase 2  
 
Regardless of your decisions in Phase 1, the composition of the groups will change. You are 
assigned to two groups, each consisting of you and another individual with whom you were not 
paired in Phase 1.  As in Phase 1, the other individuals in the two groups will also be different 
from each other.  This period is similar to the previous period in that you will simultaneously 
make two decisions: You will determine whether you should allocate some, all, or none of 20 
points to either a private account or a group account.  As in Phase 1, the consequences of your 
decisions affect your earnings.  However, in Phase 2, there is a significant difference because this 
period consists of two stages.   
 
In Stage 2, you make two allocation decisions regarding two endowments. However, your 
earnings from the allocation stage can be reduced.  Your earnings can be reduced if your group 
votes to implement a reduction scheme. Your earnings can also be reduced if the computer 
implements the scheme regardless of your votes. Both of these outcomes regarding the 
implementation of the reduction scheme occur in Stage 1.   If the scheme is in place, allocations 
to the private account are subject to reductions, and you will be deducted 0.3 points for each 
point that you allocate to the private account.   Here is the detailed procedure of this phase. 
 
(1) Stage 1:  
 
The procedure that a rule is determined in each group consists of two steps.  
 
First, at the beginning of Phase 2, each individual, including you, votes on whether or not to use 
the scheme in the individual’s assigned two groups. Since each individual belongs to two groups, 
the individual makes two voting decisions, one for each group. 
 
Second, after every individual completes the voting decision, the computer randomly decides 
whether or not their votes are considered in each group.   
 
If the computer decides to consider their votes, the scheme is implemented if it receives a 
majority of the votes. That means, if 2 individuals vote in favor of the scheme, the scheme is 
implemented. If no individual votes for the use of the scheme, the scheme is not implemented.  If 
1 individual votes in favor and 1 votes against the use of the reduction scheme, the computer 
randomly breaks the tie.   
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When the computer decides not to consider a group’s votes, it randomly chooses whether or not 
to implement the scheme in that group regardless of how the individuals in the group voted. 
 
After completing the voting process, you will be informed whether or not the individuals’ votes 
were considered for each group and whether or not the scheme was implemented.  Thus, the 
possible vote outcomes are:  
 
1) Individuals’ votes were considered and the scheme has been implemented by your votes,  
2) Individuals’ votes were considered and the scheme has not been implemented by your votes, 
3) Individuals’ votes were not considered and the scheme has been implemented by the computer,  
4) Individuals’ votes were not considered and the scheme has not been implemented by the 
computer. 
 
In this stage, for each group, you will be aware of whether at least one, or at most one individual 
in the group voted for the use of the scheme. If 1 individual voted in favor of and 1 voted against 
the use of the scheme, the computer randomly chooses whether to report at least one voted for 
the use of the scheme or at most one voted for the use of the scheme. 
 
(2) Stage 2:  
 
Once Stage 1 is completed, you will move on to the allocation stage. Here, every individual 
simultaneously decides how to use two endowments of 20 points, forty points total, between the 
private vs. the group accounts.  As in period 1, only integers between 0 and 20 are allowed for 
this purpose. 
 
How to calculate your earnings: 
 
Since you belong to two groups (which we call group 1 and group 2 below), as in Phase 1, your 
earnings will consist of the sum of your group 1 earnings and your group 2 earnings. 
 
Depending on whether or not the reduction scheme has been implemented, the formula for your 
earnings in a given group may be different. If the scheme has not been implemented, 
 
earnings = {20 – (points you allocated to the group account) + 0.6 * (sum of points  
allocated by you and the other individual in your group to the group account)}, 
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which is the same as the formula in Phase 1. 
 
If the scheme has been implemented, 
 
earnings = {20 – (points you allocated to the group account) + 0.6 * (sum of points  
allocated by you and the other individual in your group to the group account)} 
– (your reduction)}, 
where (your reduction) = 0.3 * (points you allocated to the private account). 
 
Note that when the reduction scheme is in place, the more you allocate to the private account the 
more your earnings will be reduced. 
 
 
The following is the summary of the procedure:  
 
(1) You will vote on whether or not to use a reduction scheme in each of your assigned two 
groups. 
(2) The computer randomly chooses whether or not the votes are considered. 
(3) If the computer decides to consider the votes, the majority rule is applied. If the computer 
decides not to consider the votes, the computer randomly chooses whether or not to use the 
scheme. 
(4) You are informed of vote outcomes in your assigned two groups. The outcome would be 
either: a) individual votes were considered and the scheme has been implemented by your 
votes, b) individual votes were considered and the scheme has not been implemented by your 
votes, c) individual votes were not considered and the scheme has been implemented by the 
computer, or d) individual votes were not considered and the scheme has not been 
implemented by the computer. 
(5) Every individual makes two allocation decisions.  
 
Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions.  Raise your hand if you need help.  A member of the 
experiment team will come to help you and will check your answers when you are done. When 
we confirm that everyone has answered the questions correctly, we will start Phase 2. 
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1. Do your votes always determine whether or not the reduction scheme is  
implemented? 
□ Yes  □ No 
 
2. When the scheme is in place, how many points are deducted from your earnings for each 
point that you allocate to the private account? 
  _________ points 
 
3. Suppose that in your group 1 the scheme is in place. Also suppose that you and the other 
individual in the group allocate 10 points and 5 points, respectively, to the group account.  
a) How many points will be deducted from your earnings?         ________ points 
b) What are your earnings from this account?                               _________ points 
 
 
 
Immediately before the subjects began to answer the comprehension questions, the experimenter 
instructed subjects to try to answer the questions on their own. The experimenter added that if 
subjects had any questions, they should raise their hand and the experimenter would come to 
help them.  
 
When each subject had solved all the questions, the experimenter explained the correct answers 
using the white board. 
 
The experimenter then stated: “If you have any questions about Phase 2, please raise your hand.  
If not, we’ll begin Phase 2 now.” 
 
 
A.2. Intelligence Tests 
 
 
When Phase 2 of the main part of experiment was completed, the experimenter read the 
following instructions:  
 
“We will now move on to the second part of today’s experiments. As before, you are not allowed 
to communicate with other participants during this portion of the experiment.  In this part, you 
will have to answer four questions for which you can earn points (6 points = $1.00). For each 
question, fill in the blank as the instructions on the computer screen indicate, and continue to the 
next task. Once you submit your answer you cannot go back and change your answer.  You are 
given 30 seconds for each question. For the first 3 questions, if you fail to answer or confirm 
your answer within 30 seconds, this answer will be counted as incorrect. For each correct 
response to questions 1 – 3, you earn 7 points. For Question 4, earnings will be explained on the 
computer screen later. For Question 4, although there is a timer, you can spend more than 30 
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seconds on the question. That means, you will proceed to the next screen only after you click the 
“Confirm” bottom. Any questions? If not, I will start the computer questionnaires.” 
 
The following is a list of the second part of the experiment: 
 
Question 1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? Provide the answer in integers (cents). 
 
Question 2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how much would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? Provide the answer in integers (minutes). 
 
Question 3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half 
of the lake? Provide the answer in integers (days). 
 
Question 4. Each participant will choose a number (integer) between 0 and 100. The participant 
with the closest number to two thirds of the average of all numbers in this session will earn 120 
points. Please choose your number now. 
 
 
A.3. Exit Questions 
 
 
When the second part of the experiment was complete, the experimenter read the following 
instructions: 
 
“Thank you for your participation today. This is your final task. You are still not allowed to 
communicate with other participants. You will be asked several questions about your semester 
level, economics course experience, concentration, nationality and gender, and SAT scores. After 
you have answered these questions, your exact earnings will be calculated and shown to you.  
When you finish this part, please remain in your seat while we count out your earnings, which 
we will bring out to you individually. Any questions? Please begin.” 
 
 
The following is a list of the exit questions: 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1) Please indicate your concentration/s.  
 
2) How many semesters of college or university (not including this semester) have you 
completed? 
 
3) How many economics courses have you taken? 
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4) How many political science courses have you taken? 
 
5) What is your nationality? (Ex. American) 
 
6) Gender 
 
7) What were your SAT (Math) scores? 
 
8) What were your SAT (Verbal) scores? 
 
 
When a participant completed this set of questions, he/she saw the following computer screen: 
 
“In total you earned the following amount of USD: XX” 
 
 
When participants clicked the “continue” bottom, they saw the following screen: 
 
“Thank you for your participation.” 
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Fig. B.1. Computer Screen Copies in the Contribution Stage in Period 2 
 
(a) An Example under the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) 
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(b) An Example under the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) 
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Fig. B.2. Game Tree of the Period 2 Voting Game in each Group 
 
 
  
Notes: “Dem” means that majority rule determines the implementation, while “Comp” means that the computer 
stochastically determines whether or not to use the policy. “Imp” means that the policy is imposed while “Not” means 
that the policy is not imposed. “Yes” and “No” indicate that the individual votes in favor of and against, respectively, 
the use of the non-deterrent sanction policy. Numbers in terminal nodes indicate pairs of material payoffs 
(experimental currency units), one for each group member.  For simplification, nodes and branches that describe the 
“information feedback” are not depicted in Fig. B.2. 
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Table B.1. Summary Statistics: the Characteristics of Subjects  
 
 
(a) Distribution of Votes 
 
   
 
(i) All data 
(ii) Voter Type 
  
 Yes-Yes Voter No-No Voter Yes-No Voter 
     
     
 Number of subjects 300 127 (42.3%) 143 (47.7%) 30 (10.0%) 
     
 
 
 
(b) Sample Mean of Individual Characteristics 
 
   
 
(i) All data 
(ii) Voter Type 
  
 Yes-Yes Voter No-No Voter Yes-No Voter 
     
     
(1) Average CRT score 1.40 1.57 1.36 .83 
(2) Average beauty contest 
game response 
36.5 35.1 36.7 41.7 
(3) Average SAT (Math)  
   score 
731.8 744.1 735.1 663.8 
(4) Average SAT (Verbal)  
    score 
716.4 726.8 713.8 685.4 
(5) Average number of 
college or university 
semesters completed 
3.09 3.25 2.92 3.23 
(6) Average number of 
economics courses taken 
1.53 1.57 1.64 .80 
(7) Average number of 
political science courses 
taken 
.80 .78 .82 .80 
(8) The proportion of 
economics concentrators 
15.3% 18.1% 14.0% 10.0% 
     
(9) Average earnings in  
the experiment 
$21.38 
(S.D. = $5.04) 
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Table B.2. Individual Voting Decisions and Implementation Outcomes 
 
 
 
  
 Voting decisions in individuals’ two assigned groups 
      
 Total ‘yes, yes’ ‘yes, no’ ‘no, yes’ ‘no, no’ 
      
      
“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” 120 67 10 6 37 
      
“Dem Imp, Comp Not” 20 15 1 0 4 
      
“Dem Not, Comp Imp” 54 2 0 3 49 
      
“Dem Not, Comp Not” 6 0 0 1 5 
      
“Comp Imp, Comp Imp” 76 31 8 0 37 
      
“Comp Imp, Comp Not” 22 10 1 0 11 
      
“Comp Not, Comp Not” 2 2 0 0 0 
      
Total 300 127 20 10 143 
      
 
Notes: “yes” and “no” in the column heading indicate that the individual voted in favor of and against the 
introduction of the sanction policy in a group, respectively. Numbers whose row condition is “X, Y” and whose 
column condition is ‘a, b’ are the number of subjects that voted a in a group having an implementation outcome X 
and that voted b in the other group having an outcome Y. 
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Table B.3. Individual Voting Decisions and Average Contribution Amounts in Period 2  
 
(a) Number of Subjects by Period 1 Average Contribution and Period 2’s Scheme 
 
   
Vote decisions and outcomes in 
individuals’ two assigned groups 
 Period 1 average contribution (x) 
All data 
Lower 25%: 
x = 0 
  Middle 50%: 
     0 < x < 10  
 
Upper 25%: 
x ≥ 10 
 
 
 
Lower half: 
0 < x ≤ 5  
Upper half: 
5 < x < 10 
 
       
       
Subjects who belonged to a democratic group and an undemocratic group   
       
(1) “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” 120 40 43 18 25 37 
       
 a) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Imp-yes” 67 18 19 5 14 30 
       
 b) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Imp-no” 10 2 6 2 4 2 
       
 c) “Dem Imp-no, Comp Imp-yes” 6 2 4 3 1 0 
       
 d) “Dem Imp-no, Comp Imp-no” 37 18 14 8 6 5 
       
(2) “Dem Imp, Comp Not” 20 3 10 4 6 7 
       
 a) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Not-yes” 15 2 7 3 4 6 
       
 b) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Not-no” 1 0 1 1 0 0 
       
 c) “Dem Imp-no, Comp Not-no” 4 1 2 0 2 1 
       
(3) “Dem Not, Comp Imp” 54 16 26 11 15 12 
       
 a) “Dem Not-yes, Comp Imp-yes” 2 1 1 0 1 0 
       
 b) “Dem Not-no, Comp Imp-yes” 3 1 1 1 0 1 
       
 c) “Dem Not-no, Comp Imp-no” 49 14 24 10 14 11 
        
(4) “Dem Not, Comp Not” 6 3 2 0 2 1 
       
 a) “Dem Not-no, Comp Not-yes” 1 0 1 0 1 0 
       
 b) “Dem Not-no, Comp Not-no” 5 3 1 0 1 1 
       
Subjects who belonged to two undemocratic groups   
       
(5) “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” 76 34 31 19 12 11 
       
 a) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Imp-yes” 31 10 15 9 6 6 
       
 b) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Imp-no” 8 0 6 4 2 2 
       
 c) “Comp Imp-no, Comp Imp-no” 37 24 10 6 4 3 
       
(6) “Comp Imp, Comp Not” 22 8 8 5 3 6 
       
 a) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Not-yes” 10 4 3 3 0 3 
       
 b) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Not-no” 1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
 c) “Comp Imp-no, Comp Not-no” 11 4 5 2 3 2 
       
(7) “Comp Not, Comp Not” 2 1 0 0 0 1 
       
 a) “Comp Not-yes, Comp Not-yes” 2 1 0 0 0 1 
       
 
Notes: Two pairs in each cell in the first column indicate implementation outcomes in individuals’ two assigned 
groups. “yes” and “no” indicate that the individual voted in favor of and against, respectively, the use of the sanction 
policy in each of their groups. The set of x-y voters in the implementation condition “S, T,” where S, T  {Dem 
Imp, Dem Not, Comp Imp, Comp Not} and x, y  {yes, no}, is denoted as “S-x, T-y.” For example, the set of Yes-
Yes voters in the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) is denoted as “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Imp-yes.” 
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(b) Average Contributions in Period 2 and Standard Deviations 
 
   
Vote decisions and outcomes in 
individuals’ two assigned groups 
 Period 1 average contribution (x) 
All data 
Lower 25%: 
x = 0 
  Middle 50%: 
   0 < x < 10 
 
Upper 25%: 
x ≥ 10 
   
Lower half: 
0 < x ≤ 5  
Upper half: 
5 < x < 10 
 
       
       
 Subjects who belonged to a democratic group and an undemocratic group   
       
(1) “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” 
13.2,   12.6  
 
(8.10), (8.38) 
9.63,   8.25 
 
(9.57), (9.44) 
13.7,   13.6 
 
(6.67), (6.85) 
11.9,    12.1 
 
(7.47), (7.74) 
15.0,  14.8 
 
(5.86), (6.03) 
16.6,  16.2 
 
(6.30), (6.76) 
                       
 a) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Imp-yes” 
16.6,   15.7 
 
(6.65), (7.28) 
11.7,    9.72 
 
(9.85), (10.1) 
18.0,   17.9 
 
(3.59), (3.36) 
19.0,    18.6 
 
(2.24), (3.13) 
17.6,  17.6 
 
(3.97), (3.52) 
18.6,   18.0 
 
(3.90), (4.85) 
       
 b) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Imp-no” 
13.9,   10.3 
 
(3.63), (6.60) 
17.5,     7.5 
 
(3.54), (10.6) 
12.8,   10.0 
 
(3.71), (5.73) 
16.0,     8.5 
 
(1.41), (9.19) 
11.3,  10.8 
 
(3.50), (4.92) 
13.5,  14.0 
 
(2.12), (8.49) 
       
 c) “Dem Imp-no, Comp Imp-yes” 
11.2,   12.3 
 
(6.91), (7.97) 
7.5,      7.5 
 
(10.6), (10.6) 
13.0,  14.8 
 
(5.35), (6.70) 
11.7,   14.3 
 
(5.69), (8.14) 
17.0,  16.0 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
n.a. 
       
 d) “Dem Imp-no, Comp Imp-no” 
7.35,   7.65 
 
(8.31), (8.40) 
6.94,   6.94 
 
(9.26), (9.26) 
8.43,   9.07 
 
(7.52), (7.57) 
6.63,   8.00 
 
(7.11), (7.33) 
10.8,  10.5 
 
(8.01), (8.34) 
5.80,   6.20 
 
(8.14), (8.50) 
       
(2) “Dem Imp, Comp Not” 
14.9,   5.45 
 
(7.12), (6.32) 
13.3,   .00  
 
(11.5),  (.00) 
13.8,   5.50 
 
(5.77), (6.19) 
10.5,  1.75 
 
(7.14),  (3.50) 
16.0,   8.00 
 
(3.85),  (6.54) 
17.1,  7.71 
 
(7.56), (6.95) 
       
 a) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Not-yes” 
14.4,    5.20 
 
(7.98),  (5.89) 
10.0,  .00 
 
(14.1), (.00) 
13.7,  4.14 
 
(6.90), (3.89) 
9.00,  2.33 
 
(7.94), (4.04) 
17.3,  5.50 
 
(3.77), (3.70) 
16.7,  8.17 
 
(8.16), (7.49) 
       
 b) “Dem Imp-yes, Comp Not-no” 
15.0,    .00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
n.a. 
15.0,    .00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
15.0,   .00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
n.a. n.a. 
       
 c) “Dem Imp-no, Comp Not-no” 
16.8,    7.75 
 
(4.27),  (8.58) 
20.0,    .00 
 
(.00),    (.00) 
13.5,  13.0 
 
(3.54), (9.90) 
n.a. 
13.5,  13.0 
 
(3.54), (9.90) 
20.0,  5.00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
       
(3) “Dem Not, Comp Imp” 
3.67,    11.5 
 
(6.03),  (7.58) 
.00,    8.31 
 
(.00),  (8.50) 
3.73,  12.6 
 
(5.56), (6.79) 
4.00,   8.91 
 
(7.28), (7.75) 
3.53,  15.3 
 
(4.16), (4.56) 
8.42,   13.3 
 
(7.81), (7.19)   
       
 a) “Dem Not-yes, Comp Imp-yes” 
3.50,   19.5 
 
(4.95),  (.71) 
.00,    20.0 
  
(.00),  (.00) 
7.00,  19.0 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
n.a. 
7.00,   19.0 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
n.a. 
       
 b) “Dem Not-no, Comp Imp-yes” 
2.67,   7.67 
 
(2.52),  (6.43) 
.00,  15.0 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
3.00,  3.00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
3.00,  3.00 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
n.a. 
5.00,  5.00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
       
 c) “Dem Not-no, Comp Imp-no” 
3.73,  10.9 
 
(6.27),  (7.63)  
.00,   7.00 
 
(.00),  (8.22) 
3.62,  12.0 
 
(5.75), (6.76) 
4.10,  7.80 
 
(7.67), (7.19) 
3.29,  15.1 
 
(4.20), (4.62) 
8.73, 13.2 
 
(8.11),  (7.52) 
       
(4) “Dem Not, Comp Not” 
4.33,    5.00 
 
(4.97),  (5.48) 
.00,     .00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
8.00,   10.0 
 
(2.83),  (.00) 
n.a. 
8.00,  10.0 
 
(2.83),  (.00) 
10.0,  10.0 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
       
 a) “Dem Not-no, Comp Not-yes” 
10.0,   10.0 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
n.a. 
10.0,   10.0 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
n.a. 
10.0,   10.0 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
n.a. 
       
 b) “Dem Not-no, Comp Not-no” 
3.20,   4.00 
 
(4.60),  (5.48) 
.00,    .00 
 
(.00),  (.00) 
6.00,  10.0 
 
(.00), (.00) 
n.a. 
6.00,  10.0 
 
(.00), (.00) 
10.0,  10.0 
 
(.00), (.00) 
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 Subjects who belonged to two undemocratic groups     
       
       
(5) “Comp Imp, Comp Imp”#1 
9.09 
 
(8.33) 
3.68 
 
(7.72) 
12.0 
 
(5.96) 
12.2  
 
(6.65) 
11.6 
 
(5.67) 
17.7 
 
(2.91) 
       
a) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Imp-yes”#1 
12.0 
 
(8.43) 
6.00 
 
(8.43) 
13.7 
 
(6.57) 
15.1 
 
(6.32) 
11.6 
 
(6.95) 
18.1 
 
(3.61) 
       
b) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Imp-no” 
15.6,   9.63 
 
(5.07), (5.29) 
n.a. 
15.0,   8.67 
 
(5.62), (5.68) 
13.8, 6.25 
 
(6.5), (5.38) 
17.5,   13.5 
 
(3.54), (2.12) 
17.5,   12.5 
 
(3.54), (3.54) 
       
c) “Comp Imp-no, Comp Imp-no”#1 
5.84 
 
(7.81) 
2.71 
 
(6.75) 
9.45 
 
(5.45) 
9.33 
 
(6.09) 
9.63 
 
(5.22) 
18.8 
 
(20.2) 
       
(6) “Comp Imp, Comp Not” 
9.23,   3.91 
 
(8.60),  (5.98) 
3.75,   .00 
 
(7.44),  (.00) 
9.62,   4.13 
 
(8.77), (6.13) 
8.00,   3.00 
 
(9.08), (2.74) 
12.3,    6.00 
 
(9.29), (10.4) 
16.0,  8.83 
 
(4.69), (6.65) 
       
a) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Not-yes” 
9.50,   4.50 
 
(9.56),  (6.85)  
7.50,   .00 
 
(9.57),  (.00) 
1.67,  1.67 
 
(2.89), (2.89) 
1.67,  1.67 
 
(2.89), (2.89) 
n.a 
20.0, 13.3 
 
(.00), (5.77) 
       
b) “Comp Imp-yes, Comp Not-no” 
10.0,    .00 
 
(.00),   (.00) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
10.0,    .00 
 
(.00),     (.00) 
       
c) “Comp Imp-no, Comp Not-no” 
8.91,  3.72 
 
(8.53),   (5.57) 
.00,  .00 
 
(.00), (.00) 
14.4,   5.60 
 
(7.37), (7.37) 
17.5,  5.00 
 
(3.54), (.00) 
12.3,  6.00 
 
(9.29), (10.4) 
13.0,   6.50 
 
(2.83), (2.12) 
       
(7) “Comp Not, Comp Not”#1 
10.0  
 
(14.1) 
.00 
 
(.00) 
n.a. n.a. n.a 
20.0 
 
(.00) 
       
a) “Comp Not-yes, Comp Not-yes”#1 
10.0  
 
(14.1) 
.00 
 
(.00) 
n.a. n.a. n.a 
20.0 
 
(.00) 
       
       
 All  300 subjects
#1
 
10.2 
(7.73) 
5.56 
(7.89) 
11.2 
(6.13) 
10.0 
(6.66) 
12.2 
(5.44) 
15.0 
(6.18) 
       
       
 
Notes: Left numbers in each cell are the average contribution amounts under the left condition, whereas right 
numbers are the average contribution amounts under the right condition, in the first column of the corresponding 
row.  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  The set of x-y voters in the implementation condition “S, T,” 
where S, T  {Dem Imp, Dem Not, Comp Imp, Comp Not} and x, y  {yes, no}, is denoted as “S-x, T-y.”  
  
#1
 There are two observations (contribution amounts) per subject and thus the average of the two contribution 
amounts is used to calculate the standard deviations. 
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Table B.4. Average Contribution Amounts in Period 2 by the Information Feedback and 
Implementation Outcome 
 
 
(A) Treatment Condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) 
 
  
Yes-Yes Voter No-No voter 
  
  
(i) When they received the information At-Least in their democratic groups: 
16.46 [52] 10.9 [14] 
 
(ii) When they received the information At-Least in their undemocratic groups: 
15.56 [48] 5.63 [8] 
  
(iii) When they received the information At-Most in their democratic groups: 
16.87 [15] 5.17 [23] 
  
(iv) When they received the information At-Most in their undemocratic groups: 
16.16 [19] 8.21 [29] 
  
 
 
(B) Control Condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) 
 
  
Yes-Yes Voter No-No voter 
  
  
(i) When they received the information At-Least: 
13.80 [41] 4.48 [21] 
 
(ii) When they received the information At-Most: 
8.62 [21] 6.38 [53] 
  
 
 
Notes: Numbers in squared bracket are the numbers of observations. 
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Table B.5. The Effects of Democracy on Yes-Yes voters (Supplementing the regression analysis 
in Table 2 of the paper). 
 
 
To supplement the regression analyses of Table 2, we estimated the effects of democracy by 
including only one of the four IQ measures, instead of the first principal component of the IQ 
measures. 
 
 
(I) The Direct Effect of Democracy 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the democratic groups by Yes-Yes voters in the treatment 
condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and contribution amounts by Yes-Yes voters in the control condition 
(“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) (Reference group).  
 
         
 
Average Effects Median Effects 
Independent Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  
         
         
“Dem Imp, Comp 
Imp” dummy 
[the direct effect of 
democracy] 
3.56** 
(1.67) 
3.46** 
(1.61) 
3.26* 
(1.76) 
3.34* 
(1.79) 
5.00*** 
(.000) 
5.00*** 
(.000) 
4.80*** 
(.13) 
4.51*** 
(.23) 
         
IQ measure 
 Beauty 
contest game  
Score 
 Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT 
(Math) 
score 
SAT 
(Verbal) 
score  
 Beauty 
contest game  
Score 
 Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT 
(Math) 
score 
SAT 
(Verbal) 
score  
         
# of Observations 98 98 91
#1
 90
#2
 98 98 91
#1
 90
#2
 
Adjusted R-Squared 
(Pseudo R-Squared) 
.1939 .2435 .1979 .1820 .0545 .0545 .0460 .0469 
         
 
 
Notes: OLS regressions in columns (1) to (4), and median (quantile) regressions in columns (5) and (8). The 
reference group is the average contribution amounts of Yes-Yes voters in the “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” condition; in 
this condition, since each subject made two contribution decisions in the same environment, the average of the two 
contribution amounts is used as each individual’s data. The control variables include period 1 average contributions, 
period 1 partners’ average contributions, one IQ measure, Female dummy (which equals 1 if female, 0 otherwise), 
the number of economics courses taken, and the number of political sciences courses taken. 
#1
 Seven subjects were 
excluded since they did not answer their SAT (math) scores. 
#2
 Eight subjects were excluded since they did not 
answer their SAT (verbal) scores. 
   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(II) The Spill-Over Effect of Democracy 
 
 Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the undemocratic groups by Yes-Yes voters in the 
treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and contribution amounts by Yes-Yes voters in the control 
condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) (Reference group). 
 
 
         
 
Average Effects Median Effects 
Independent Variable (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14)  (15) (16)  
         
         
(ii) “Dem Imp, Comp 
Imp” dummy 
[the spill-over effect 
of democracy] 
3.27* 
(1.66) 
3.24** 
(1.63) 
2.95* 
(1.75) 
3.00* 
(1.78) 
3.97*** 
(1.45) 
3.99* 
(2.09) 
1.99 
(1.96) 
2.59 
(1.84) 
         
IQ measure 
 Beauty 
contest game  
Score 
 Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT 
(Math) 
score 
SAT 
(Verbal) 
score  
 Beauty  
contest game  
Score 
 Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT 
(Math) 
score 
SAT 
(Verbal) 
score  
         
# of Observations 98 98 91
#1
 90
#2
 98 98 91
#1
 90
#2
 
Adjusted R-Squared 
(Pseudo R-Squared) 
.2583 .2864 .2661 .2502 .0875 .0882 .1066 .1089 
         
 
 
Notes: OLS regressions in columns (9) and (12), and median (quantile) regressions in columns (13) and (16). The 
reference group is the average contribution amounts of Yes-Yes voters in the “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” condition; in 
this condition, since each subject made two contribution decisions in the same environment, the average of the two 
contribution amounts is used as each individual’s data. The control variables include period 1 average contributions, 
period 1 partners’ average contributions, one IQ measure, Female dummy (which equals 1 if female, 0 otherwise), 
the number of economics courses taken, and the number of political sciences courses taken.
  #1
 Seven subjects were 
excluded since they did not answer their SAT (math) scores. 
#2
 Eight subjects were excluded since they did not 
answer their SAT (verbal) scores.
 
    
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table B.6. The Impact of Information Feedback on Yes-Yes voters’ Contribution Behavior in 
the Treatment Condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Yes-Yes voters’ contribution amounts to their democratic groups in the 
“Demo Imp, Comp Imp” condition in columns (1) and (2); Yes-Yes voters’ contribution amounts 
to their undemocratic groups in the “Demo Imp, Comp Imp” condition in columns (3) and (4). 
 
     
 
“Dem Imp” groups “Comp Imp” groups 
    
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Information At-Least 
dummy
#1
 
-.41 
(1.96) 
.33 
(2.09) 
-.60 
(1.99) 
-1.34 
(1.92) 
     
Control variable
#2
 No Yes No Yes 
     
Constant 16.9*** 14.0*** 16.2*** 16.4*** 
 (1.73) (2.36) (1.68) (2.28) 
 
  
  
# of Observations 67 60 67 60 
Adjusted R-Squared -.0147 .1530 -.0140 .3196 
     
 
 
Notes: OLS regressions. Results are similar even if we use median (quantile) regressions, instead of OLS regressions.
 
 #1
 The information At-Least dummy equals 1 if a subject received the information At-Least; 0 otherwise.  
 
#2
 Control variables include period 1 average contribution, period 1 partners’ average contribution, the female 
dummy (which equals 1 if female; 0 otherwise), the number of political science courses taken, the number of 
economics course taken, the first principal component of all four IQ measures. The information At-Least dummy 
fails to obtain a significant coefficient in each column if any one of the four IQ measures, instead of the first 
principal component, is used: results are omitted to conserve space. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table B.7. The Effects of Democracy on No-No voters (Supplementing the regression analysis 
in Table 3 of the paper). 
 
 
To supplement the regression analyses of Table 3, we estimated the effects of democracy by 
including only one of the four IQ measures, instead of the first principal component of the IQ 
measures. 
 
 
(I) The Direct Effect of Democracy 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the democratic groups by No-No voters in the treatment 
condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and contribution amounts by No-No voters in the control condition 
(“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) (Reference group).  
 
 
 
         
 Average Effects Median Effects 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         
         
“Dem Imp, Comp 
Imp” dummy 
[the direct effect of 
democracy] 
.50 
(1.76) 
.37 
(1.73) 
.63 
(1.80) 
.37 
(1.77) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00*** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
         
IQ measure 
Beauty 
contest game 
scores 
Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT 
(Math) 
score 
SAT 
(Verbal) 
score 
Beauty 
contest game 
scores 
Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT  
(Math) 
score 
SAT  
(Verbal)  
score 
 
 
  
  
   
# of Observations 74 74 71
#2
 71
#2
 74 74 71
#2
 71
#2
 
Adjusted R-Squared 
(Pseudo R-Squared) 
.1420 .1809 .1304 .1653 .2306 .2306 .2561 .2561 
       
 
 
Notes: OLS regressions in columns (1) to (6), and median (quantile) regressions in columns (7) to (12). The 
reference group is the average contribution amounts of No-No voters in the “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” condition; in 
this condition, since each subject made two contribution decisions in the same environment, the average of the two 
contribution amounts is used as each individual’s data. The control variables include period 1 average contributions, 
period 1 partners’ average contributions, one IQ measure, Female dummy (which equals 1 if female, 0 otherwise), 
the number of economics courses taken, and the number of political sciences courses taken. 
#1
 Three subjects were 
excluded since they did not answer their SAT (math, verbal) scores. 
    
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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(II) The Spill-Over Effect of Democracy 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amounts in the undemocratic groups by No-No voters in the 
treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”), and contribution amounts by No-No voters in the 
control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) (Reference group). 
 
         
 Average Effects Median Effects 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         
         
“Dem Imp, Comp 
Imp” dummy 
[the spill-over effect of 
democracy] 
.77 
(1.78) 
.63 
(1.74) 
.91 
(1.81) 
.65 
(1.78) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.29 
(.39) 
         
 
 
  
 
    
IQ measure 
Beauty 
contest game 
scores 
Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT 
(Math) 
score 
SAT 
(Verbal) 
score 
Beauty 
contest game 
scores 
Cognitive 
reflection 
test score 
SAT  
(Math) 
score 
SAT  
(Verbal)  
score 
 
 
  
 
    
# of Observations 74 74 71
#2
 71
#2
 74 74 71
#2
 71
#2
 
Adjusted R-Squared 
(Pseudo R-Squared) 
.1377 .1761 .1346 .1637 .2285 .2285 .2537 .2589 
       
 
Notes: OLS regressions in columns (1) to (6), and median (quantile) regressions in columns (7) to (12). The 
reference group is the average contribution amounts of No-No voters in the “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” condition; in 
this condition, since each subject made two contribution decisions in the same environment, the average of the two 
contribution amounts is used as each individual’s data. The control variables include period 1 average contributions, 
period 1 partners’ average contributions, one IQ measure, Female dummy (which equals 1 if female, 0 otherwise), 
the number of economics courses taken, and the number of political sciences courses taken. 
#1
 Three subjects were 
excluded since they did not answer their SAT (math, verbal) scores. 
    
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
